An Analysis of an Alliance: NAFTA Trucking and the US Insurance Industry by Condon, Bradly & Sinha, Tapen
235
The Estey Centre Journal of
I n t e rn ational  L aw
and Trade Po l i cy
E d i t o rial Office: 410 22nd St. E . , Suite 820, S a s k a t o o n , S K , C a n a d a , S7K 5T6.
Phone (306) 244-4800; Fax (306) 244-7839; e m a i l : Ke rr. w @ s k . s y m p a t i c o. c a
An Analysis of an Alliance: NAFTA
Trucking and the US Insurance Industry1
Bradly Condon 
Professor, Department of Business, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
Tapen Sinha
Seguros Comercial America Chair Professor, Department of Actuarial Studies, Instituto
Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico and Professor, School of Business, University of
Nottingham
In the NAFTA, the United States agreed to phase out restrictions on the operation of
Mexican trucking companies in the United States. When the deadlines came, the Clinton
Administration chose to maintain the restrictions. Following a NAFTA panel ruling against
the United States, the Bush Administration announced it would remove the restrictions. The
decision has met with opposition from both truckers and insurers in the United States, who
cite safety concerns. This article examines the economic, political and legal forces at work
in this debate, as well as the relationship between the NAFTAand WTO rules on trade in ser-
vices that apply.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
B
y a 285–143 roll call, the U.S. House of Representatives voted on June 26, 2001, that
it would block the Transportation Department from issuing permits that would let
Mexican trucks operate throughout the United States. This vote is the result of opposition
from both the Democrats and the Republicans. The Democrats were pushed hard by the
truckers’ lobby and the Republicans by the insurance lobby in Washington.
Vol um e  2   N um be r  2 , 2 00 1/   p. 2 3 5 - 2 4 5 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o mThe U.S. trucking unions have opposed the entry of Mexican truckers into the United
States to transport goods on the grounds that the Mexican truckers will not meet U.S. safe-
ty standards. Underlying this opposition is the reality that U.S. truckers are likely to lose a
lot of business. Each year, about five million crossings are made, hauling about three-
fourths of the $250 billion in United States–Mexico trade. Under the new NAFTApanel rul-
ing, instead of Mexican trucks transferring their loads to U.S. truckers at the border, the
Mexican truckers will be able to carry the loads to their final destinations in the U.S.
Moreover, transportation of goods by Mexican truckers will cost less, as the wages earned
by the Mexican drivers are a fraction of what the unionized U.S. truckers charge for their
services.2
In February of 2001, a panel ruled that it was against the North American Free Trade
Agreement for the United States to put a moratorium on free movement of trucks between
the United States and Mexico. The ruling has generated a flurry of lobbying by a number
of interest groups in Washington. In what follows, we analyze the history and the current
situation and take a closer look at the politics and economics behind the ruling. We discuss
what might be ahead.
A Bit of History
P
rior to 1980, the United States granted operating authority to motor carriers for each
individual route, requiring economic justification for each proposed service. It did not
distinguish  between  United  States,  Mexican  or  Canadian  applicants.  However,  the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) severely restricted new entry into the domestic
market. In 1980, the Motor Carrier Act essentially eliminated regulatory barriers to entry,
making it easier for motor carriers from all three countries to obtain operating authority. It
did not distinguish between nationals and non-nationals. At the time, Canada already
allowed reciprocal access for U.S. truckers in its domestic market, but Mexico did not. 3
The equal treatment of U.S. and foreign applicants ended in 1982. The Bus Regulatory
Reform Act imposed an initial two-year moratorium on the issuance of new motor carrier
operating authority to foreign carriers. A presidential memorandum immediately lifted the
moratorium with respect to Canada in response to the Brock-Gotlieb Understanding, which
confirmed that U.S. carriers would have continued access to the Canadian market. The
same memorandum declined to lift the moratorium with respect to Mexico, citing U.S.
truckers’ continued lack of access to the Mexican market. The U.S. president repeatedly
extended the moratorium against Mexican truckers every two years from 1984 to 1995. The
purpose of the moratorium was to encourage Mexico to lift its restrictions on market access
for U.S. firms.4
However, there were some exceptions allowed to facilitate cross-border trade. The
commercial zone of border towns exemption has permitted Mexican carriers to operate in
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provided they obtained a Certificate of Registration from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. Under this procedure, the applicant certifies that he has access to and will
comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Applicants are not required to sub-
mit proof of insurance, but inside the commercial zones must carry proof of insurance on
board. In 1999, 8,400 Mexican firms had authority to operate in the commercial zones.5
A second exception relates to Mexican operators that transit through the United States
to Canada, which are not affected by the moratorium. Congress has not granted the
Department of Transportation the authority to require trucks transiting from Mexico to
Canada to seek operating authority, so it is not required. These Mexican trucks need only
comply with U.S. insurance requirements and safety regulations. 
Under a third exception, “grandfathered” Mexican trucking companies that had
acquired operating authority prior to 1982, when the moratorium came into effect, are not
affected. Five Mexican carriers are entitled to these exemptions.6
Under a fourth exception, the ICC Termination Act of 1995 exempts U.S.-owned
Mexican-domiciled truck companies, which number approximately 160 companies, from
the operation of the moratorium. Afifth exception, which allowed Mexican carriers to lease
both trucks and drivers to U.S. carriers, was allowed until January 1, 2000. The Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 ended the leasing exception when the United
States realized that this provision could be used to sell U.S. carriers’ operating authority to
Mexican carriers for operations beyond the border zone.7
On March 1, 1994, the transportation ministers of Canada and Mexico signed three
memoranda of understanding to permit truckers to operate between Canada and Mexico.8
The cargo-exchange agreement permits Canadian truckers to enter Mexico to exchange car-
goes at contracted Mexican terminals and facilities along the northern border of Mexico.
The commercial driver’s license reciprocity agreement lets Canadian and Mexican drivers
operate in each other’s country with their own licenses. The transportation training agree-
ment allows Canada to train Mexican personnel in the areas of maritime and port manage-
ment and truck-driving simulation.9
Under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States, Mexico and
Canada, U.S. truck carriers are able to carry freight from Canada to 20 kilometers inside
Mexico in a nearly barrier-free environment. Despite the MOU, the governments of the
United States and Mexico have been at an impasse over permitting each other full access to
their markets since 1995.
Under the NAFTA, the United States agreed to give access to Mexican trucks in 1995,
but President Bill Clinton, under heavy pressure from religious, labour, environmental and
other interest groups, kept the provision from taking effect, saying Mexico had to do more
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visions, asked that a five-member panel be set up to determine whether Washington was
violating the agreement. In its decision, the panel—two Americans, two Mexicans and a
British chairman—unanimously ruled that the United States would be in violation if it did
not begin considering applications from Mexican trucking companies. At the time, more
than 160 applications were pending.
Operating authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was10 required
to provide interstate or cross-border truck services in the United States. Under the NAFTA,
a moratorium remained in place on new grants of operating authority for persons from
Mexico. However, the United States agreed to phase out the moratorium so that Mexicans
would be permitted to obtain operating authority to provide cross-border truck services to
or from border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) as of December 16,
1995. Cross-border truck services to the remainder of the United States were to start as of
January 1, 2000. In addition, Mexicans were to be permitted to establish enterprises in the
United States to provide truck services for the transportation of international cargo between
points in the United States as of December 17, 1995. The moratorium remains in place on
grants of authority for the provision of truck services by Mexicans between points in the
United States for the transportation of goods other than international cargo.11
Recent Ruling by NAFTA P a n e l
T
he decision of the NAFTA panel requires the Department of Transportation to consid-
er applications on individual merit and not to refuse authority across the board to all
Mexican companies. In essence, the United States had argued that it could deny access to
all Mexican trucking firms on a blanket basis, regardless of the individual qualifications of
particular members of the Mexican industry, unless and until Mexico’s domestic regulato-
ry system meets U.S. approval. However, the law of the United States considered applica-
tions for operating authority from U.S. and Canadian carriers on an individual basis. This
differential treatment of Mexicans, on the one hand, and Americans and Canadians, on the
other, violated NAFTA Articles 1202 (national treatment) and 1203 (Most-Favoured-
Nation treatment).12
Article 1202 requires that each party accord to service providers of another party treat-
ment no less favourable than it accords, in like circumstances, to its own service providers.
Article 1202 also requires that each party accord to service providers of another party treat-
ment no less favourable than it accords, in like circumstances, to service providers of any
other party or non-party.
The United States argued that the continuation of the moratorium was nevertheless jus-
tified under the general exception of Article 2101, which provides that “nothing … in
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or enforcement by any party of measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or reg-
ulations … relating to health and safety and consumer protection.” Citing GATT and WTO
jurisprudence, the panel ruled that the United States had to use the least-trade-restrictive
means available to address its safety concerns. The numerous exceptions the United States
applied to the moratorium proved that there were less restrictive means available to achieve
its safety goals with respect to Mexican truckers. Thus, the blanket ban could not be justi-
fied under Article 2101.13
An interesting aspect of the decision involves the nature of reservations taken under a
trade agreement. The laws of each country must comply with the general rules of trade
agreements that it signs, such as the non-discrimination rules of national treatment and
Most-Favoured-Nation treatment. Trade agreements contain general exceptions to those
rules, for example to permit environmental and safety regulations that may have an inci-
dental effect on trade. In addition, at the time of negotiation of the trade agreement, coun-
tries may negotiate exemptions for certain industries protected from foreign competition by
specific laws. That is, countries may keep certain laws in place notwithstanding their incon-
sistency with the general rules. However, they must be listed as reservations in the annexes
of the agreement.
Reservations constitute specific instances where a country maintains laws that go
against the main objective of the trade agreement, which is to liberalize trade. As such, they
are often of limited duration and are interpreted strictly. When they expire, the law in ques-
tion must pass muster with the general rules or fit into one of the general exceptions. 
In the trucking case, the United States placed a reservation in an annex to permit the
moratorium on Mexican trucks to continue, but also included dates when specific aspects
of the moratorium would be phased out. Once the reservation expired, the United States had
to either lift the moratorium or justify it under the general rules or exceptions. Not surpris-
ingly, the moratorium did not pass muster. Had it been consistent with the NAFTArules, no
reservation would have been required in the first place. Thus, by using the reservation, the
United States virtually admitted a violation of the rules.
The panel made clear that the United States was entitled under the NAFTA to set its
own safety standards and to ensure that Mexican trucking companies meet them. Moreover,
the United States is not required to treat applications from Mexican truckers in exactly the
same manner as applications from the U.S. or Canadian firms, as long as they review appli-
cations on a case-by-case basis, comply with the NAFTA, and make decisions in good faith
with respect to legitimate safety concerns.14
Following the panel decision, the Bush administration announced that it would reverse
the Clinton administration policy and begin allowing Mexican trucks to haul goods through-
out the United States.
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U.S. truckers are not the only industry opposing the Mexican truckers. The U.S. insurance
industry is also up in arms. Why? They sell insurance to the U.S. truckers, covering not only
vehicle and liability insurance, but insurance on the goods being transported. A reduction
in the market share of the U.S. truckers will also reduce the market share of the U.S. com-
panies that insure them. Mexican truckers will buy insurance from insurance companies in
Mexico.15 Of course, the U.S. insurance companies may be concerned that Mexican truck-
ers will cause more accidents than U.S. truckers, thereby increasing payouts by insurance
companies. But if the Mexican truckers are insured by Mexican insurance companies, those
payments would not come out of the pockets of the U.S. insurance companies.
The American Insurance Association (AIA) said that Mexican trucks should be allowed
to operate only in the border states until three programs are implemented. First, the AIA
wants safety standards among the three NAFTA countries harmonized. Second, adequate
enforcement of those standards must be implemented. Third, an adequate database of
Mexican truck safety must be developed. The AIA proposal appears reasonable on the sur-
face, but is in fact designed to delay the entry of Mexican truckers beyond the border states
for many years.16 Under the NAFTA, there is no requirement to harmonize safety stan-
dards, and it may be difficult to get the countries to negotiate such an agreement. Even if
such an agreement were reached, corruption in Mexico means that adequate enforcement
in Mexico could not be achieved for many years. Finally, the creation of a database on
Mexican truck safety would be costly and time-consuming and would likely serve as fur-
ther ammunition in the effort to keep Mexican trucks out of the U.S. market.
Nevertheless, some progress has been made by the Land Transportation Standards
Subcommittee, which is charged with the task of implementing a work program to make
standards for bus and truck operations compatible.17 In 1991, Mexico became a member of
the Commercial Vehicles Safety Alliance, together with the United States and Canada. The
same year, Mexico and the United States adopted uniform guidelines for roadside inspec-
tions and uniform standards for commercial drivers’ licenses and criteria such as knowl-
edge and skills testing, disqualification, and physical requirements for drivers.18
An In-depth Look at the DOT Report
I
n 1998, the Department of Transportation (DOT) in the United States produced a report
that sealed the fate of the Mexican truckers in the United States.19 In the report, it is
claimed that Mexican trucks do not meet U.S. safety standards. The DOT reported that 44
percent of trucks inspected did not pass the safety standards. Insurance industry trade
groups argue that the U.S. government will have to spend four to seven million dollars a
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allowed to cross the border twenty miles into the United States to transfer cargo to U.S.
trucks. 
A closer inspection of the report produces a different picture. A much less quoted fig-
ure of the report says that although 44 percent of the Mexican trucks inspected did not pass
the safety standards, 27 percent of the U.S. trucks did not pass the safety standards either
(and a much lower 17 percent of the Canadian trucks did not meet the safety standards).
On the face of it, it still seems that Mexican trucks have a significantly higher failure rate
in meeting the safety standards. Such a presumption is false. Why?
When we examine the disaggregated data by state we find vastly different failure
rates—California, 28 percent; Arizona, 42 percent; New Mexico, 37 percent; and Texas, 50
percent. (The report also quotes more recent figures, for 1998, showing that overall failure
rates have become 42 percent rather than the 44 percent quoted for 1997.) Thus, it is not
the same problem across different states. There should be no presumption that Mexico only
sends “better trucks” across to California and “worse trucks” across to Texas! The problem
lies with the process of inspection. The report acknowledges that the inspection process is
not random (p. 32). If a truck “looks bad” then it is inspected more minutely. It seems that
the inspection process varies substantially across states, casting doubt on the validity of the
figure “44 percent bad trucks”.
Dimensions of the Problem
H
ow large is the problem? How many trucks cross the border into the United States?
In many press reports the number of truck crossings cited was in the region of 4.5
million.20 It was argued that allowing Mexican trucks on U.S. roads will pose a very large
problem. For example, the Public Citizen Organization (a lobby group) declared in a high-
ly charged article called “The Coming NAFTA Crash” that if Mexican trucks are allowed
into the United States, in order to carry out simple inspections the Department of
Transportation will require at least 32,000 more inspectors.21 This will overwhelm the
Department of Transportation’s border inspection system. The number of trucks that actu-
ally crossed the border in 1999 was 63,000. How did the figure of 4.5 million come about?
There seems to be some confusion between the number of crossings and the number of
trucks. While it is true that there were 4.5 million crossings, the same trucks crossed the
border time and again. Hence the presumed problem turns out to be a storm in a teacup!
Differing Standards
It is true that safety standards in Mexico and the United States differ in many ways: (1) The
United States generally limits truck weights to 80,000 pounds, compared to Mexico’s limit
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not. (3) U.S. laws require drivers to meet licensing standards that include limits on the
length of their driving shifts and drug testing, while Mexican laws do not. (4) Mexico does
not require the maintenance of driving logs or other types of data that would be needed for
enforcement. However, the lack of mandatory rules in these areas in Mexico would not pre-
vent Mexican truckers from ensuring they meet U.S. standards. Indeed, trucking compa-
nies that seek to operate across the border would be wise to impose the necessary standards
in-house. In fact, Mexican truck companies that applied for operation in the U.S. have
pledged that they will only send the trucks that comply with “normal” U.S. standards.
With respect to insurance, U.S. trucking companies must meet minimum financial
responsibility requirements to protect third-party claimants’rights of recovery. Some inter-




he NAFTA provisions granting Mexican trucks and buses free access to U.S. border
states prompted the Texas Legislature to enact several new laws that took effect on
December 5, 1995. Mexican carriers doing business beyond the Texas border commercial
zones must meet the same safety and insurance requirements as U.S. and Canadian truck-
ers. Mexican and domestic motor carriers must file proof of liability insurance coverage to
the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) in specific amounts ranging from US
$300,000 to $5,000,000, depending on the type of vehicle and cargo.
Coverage must be with a licensed company or through a self-insurance mechanism
approved by TxDOT. For-hire motor carriers of household goods must carry cargo insur-
ance in amounts required by federal law (US $5,000 per vehicle, up to US $10,000 for
aggregate loss or damage in one occurrence). 
Non-U.S. insurers, through a port-of-entry law, can obtain a Texas certificate of author-
ity to operate domestically. This law requires alien companies to establish a Texas sub-
sidiary and comply with all Texas capital, asset, and surplus requirements. Mexico’s third
largest casualty insurer, Aseguradora Mexicana (ASEMEX), was the first Mexican carrier
to be granted a Texas certificate of authority under the port-of-entry law. ASEMEX sought
the certificate in order to sell insurance to Mexican truckers who serve U.S. border zones.22
Some Proposals
C
ross-border trucking insurance remains a problem to be resolved. Impediments
remain to “seamless” insurance coverage for carriers wishing to provide trucking ser-
vices across the borders to the three NAFTA countries, that is, the ability of companies to
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issuing more than one policy. There are concerns regarding the financial ability of Mexican
domestic insurers to pay potential claims arising in the other two countries or to issue cov-
erage that complies with the requirements in the other jurisdictions. 
Canadian and U.S. insurers use a “Managing General Agent”, or fronting concept,
whereby they handle the necessary filings in each other’s jurisdiction and provide the nec-
essary proof of insurance. However, this is not available in Mexico. Mexican insurance law
requires that the entire risk be retained in Mexico and does not permit this kind of reinsur-
ance through a U.S. or Canadian insurer. Moreover, a Canadian or U.S. insurer that wish-
es to act as agent in issuing the Mexican insurer’s paper must first be so authorized by the
Mexican National Insurance and Banking Commission. One proposal to solve the problem
is a new Mexican law that would enable Canadian- or U.S.-licensed insurers to register in
Mexico for the purpose of issuing policies in Mexico to Mexican insureds for motor carri-
er risks outside Mexico. Another option would be to develop a NAFTAinsurance card sys-
tem similar to the system used in Europe.
Under international law, countries have jurisdiction to regulate activities within their
territory and to regulate the acts of their citizens. Mexico therefore has jurisdiction to reg-
ulate insurance contracts between Mexican truckers and insurance companies in Mexico.
The U.S. government has no jurisdiction in the matter. However, the U.S. has jurisdiction
to regulate the acts of Mexican truckers operating in U.S. territory.This means that the U.S.
government could legally require all trucks operating in the United States to carry insur-
ance, and dictate the type of insurance and the nature of the coverage. But can the U.S. gov-
ernment require that the insurance be purchased from U.S. insurance companies? One
could expect the U.S. insurance industry to lobby for such a law in order to maintain their
sales of insurance to truckers, be they Mexican or American.
However, under the WTO Financial Services Agreement and NAFTA Chapter 14 on
financial services, the U.S. made commitments to open up its insurance industry to foreign
suppliers. More importantly, it agreed to freeze any existing restrictions on foreign insur-
ance suppliers by listing them as reservations in schedules that have been submitted to the
WTO and attached to the NAFTA. If the U.S. were to introduce a new restriction on mar-
ket access, the law would risk being challenged by Mexico under the NAFTA or the WTO
agreement.
C o n c l u s i o n
T
his case illustrates how regional trade agreements, such as the NAFTA, can interact
with global trade agreements, such as the WTO Agreement on Trade in Financial
Services, sometimes in unanticipated ways. Opposition to free trade in trucking services
was probably not expected from the American insurance industry, and the reasons for their
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ing in the United States carry insurance issued by U.S. companies may be complicated by
the commitments the U.S. government has made under the global Financial Services
Agreement and the NAFTA.
Another complexity revealed in this case is the relationship between international
agreements and national constitutional law. While the federal government of the United
States has signed the NAFTAand WTO agreements, in many areas, such as insurance, state
governments have the power to regulate. This limits the ability of the federal government
to ensure compliance with those aspects of international agreements that fall outside its
jurisdiction under its own constitution, despite its obligation to seek such compliance.
Finally, this case shows how international agreements affect the range of domestic reg-
ulatory options available to national and subnational governments and to industries that
lobby those governments for regulations that may offer them protection from foreign com-
petition. On the one hand, the NAFTA and WTO agreements allow domestic governments
to set their own safety standards. On the other hand, they restrict the manner in which gov-
ernments may enforce those standards. Such standards must be applied in a nondiscrimi-
natory fashion. That is, they may not be used to create disguised trade barriers to foreign
competitors.
International agreements restrict the options available to domestic industry in terms of
protecting the national market from foreign competition. The trucking case shows how
industry trade groups can influence the trade policy of a government by the selective use
of information and by pursuing their economic interests in a way that makes it appear they
are really seeking what is in the public interest. Most often, however, their goal is to pro-
tect their domestic market from foreign competitors.23
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